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Abstract 
 
The following master’s thesis studies the mechanical effects of electoral systems on two 
electoral outcomes – proportionality and parliament fragmentation. The aim of the study 
is to investigate whether there is a precise universal relationship between proportionality 
and fragmentation across different electoral systems. The thesis places itself into the 
general framework of new institutionalism, saying that institutions including electoral 
systems matter, but their precise effects depend on the context in which they operate. 
We propose that if context is taken into account and held under control while analysing 
pure mechanical effects of electoral systems, a clear universal pattern emerges between 
proportionality and fragmentation. A computational experiment is carried out using 
constituency level data of 5 countries and 10 elections from the CLEA database. The 
results show a squared relationship between proportionality and parliament 
fragmentation, not a linear one that has been a tacit assumption in the debate between 
the proponents of majoritarian and proportional electoral systems. Testing this squared 
relationship on broader data proves its validity, especially for PR electoral systems.   
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Introduction 
 
Electoral systems are crucial institutions for democracy to function. The choice of 
electoral system determines the main characteristics of the democratic regime as it 
significantly influences political outputs. In addition to the fact that electoral systems 
allocate parliamentary seats – who gets in and who is left out – they shape the main 
features of political system and the nature of party competition more broadly. It is 
important to analyse electoral system effects in order to better understand the 
functioning of democratic political systems around the world. 
There has been a general consensus in the literature of electoral studies that there is no 
such thing as the ideal electoral system. It is standard practice to acknowledge the 
inevitability of trade-offs when discussing the pros and cons of different systems 
(Carey, Hix 2011: 383). There are two main conceptually conflicting ideals of electoral 
systems – the ideal of representativeness (i.e. high proportionality) and the ideal of 
accountability (stable single-party governments, i.e. low fragmentation). The 
representation ideal is best achieved by proportional representation (PR) electoral 
systems; accountability ideal by majoritarian electoral systems.  
It is widely accepted that these two ideals are contradictory as it is impossible to achieve 
both highly representative as well as highly accountable parliament. It seems to hold 
true, because high proportionality allows more actors into the parliament, which by 
definition means higher parliament fragmentation. One must decide what she cares 
about most: representation or accountability, because one cannot have both. 
We could think that the trade-off between representation and accountability is thus 
linear. The higher the proportionality, the higher is the fragmentation, and vice versa. 
Furthermore, as electoral systems are sets of mathematical rules, we would expect to see 
a clear linear pattern when graphing fragmentation measures against proportionality 
measures. However, simple descriptive statistics of electoral outcomes show that these 
expectations do not hold true (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2 in Chapter 2). There is by no 
means a linear relationship between those two phenomena. Moreover, the picture seems 
blurry – there is no precise pattern at all between proportionality and fragmentation. So 
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it is important to investigate why there is no clear pattern that would reflect the 
contradictory nature of the two ideals when comparing proportionality and 
fragmentation indices. 
Building on the new institutionalism framework, we propose that we cannot see a clear 
pattern in electoral outcomes without taking context into account. According to the new 
institutionalist logic, institutions (including electoral systems) are important as they 
affect the political outcomes. But institutions are also endogenous – their functioning 
depends on the conditions in which they emerge and operate. Thus, when analysing 
electoral systems’ mechanical effects on proportionality and fragmentation, we need to 
hold context under control in order to see a clear pattern. 
The aim of this thesis is to gain better insight into mechanical effects that electoral 
systems have on proportionality and fragmentation. The first main analytical question is 
how various electoral systems (i.e. different electoral formulae or district magnitudes) in 
different contexts affect proportionality and parliament fragmentation and whether there 
exists a universal relationship between those phenomena. We propose that there is a 
universal relationship between proportionality and fragmentation, but only when 
context is held under control by normalising the values of proportionality and 
fragmentation indices. The second question addressed in this thesis is whether the 
relationship between proportionality and fragmentation is linear. We expect to see that 
the trade-off between representation and accountability is non-linear, as Carey and Hix 
(2011) proposed, and that low-magnitude districts optimise this trade-off. 
To answer the proposed questions, a computational experiment is carried out. Using 
regional level data for 5 countries and 10 elections from the CLEA database, we 
calculate alternative seat distributions for each election if different electoral rules were 
used. We vary both the electoral formulae as well as district magnitude in our 
experiment. This computational experiment gives us at least six different seat 
distributions for every vote distribution.  By holding the input side (vote distributions) 
constant, the variations in seat distributions can be attributed to electoral systems’ 
mechanical effects only. Normalising the values of proportionality and fragmentation 
allows us to meaningfully look into the universal relationship between those features. 
We believe that the initial blurry picture then becomes clearer. 
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The thesis is divided into four main chapters. The first chapter gives an overview of the 
importance of electoral systems and their effects. It discusses how in addition to 
mechanical effects, electoral systems also have psychological effects that cannot be 
ignored when analysing the former. Psychological effects make it difficult to study 
“pure” mechanical effects, but there are ways to overcome the challenges. The second 
chapter theoretically explains the two main concepts of this thesis, proportionality and 
parliament fragmentation, and discusses the conflicting nature of the two democratic 
ideals of representation and accountability. The third chapter describes in detail the 
method used in this thesis and how context is taken into account. Furthermore, 
operationalisation of the central concepts is provided in this chapter as well as the 
overview of the cases and data. The final chapter is fully dedicated to the empirical 
study and its results – the precise relationship between proportionality and 
fragmentation is analysed and tested. 
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1. Why and how to study electoral system mechanical effects? 
 
There is a growing body of literature on electoral system effects. The understanding of 
how different variables such as district magnitude and electoral formula affect electoral 
outcomes has improved significantly. But there is still much left to discover and 
explain. Electoral systems are essentially sets of mathematical rules, which means that 
their effects should be quite accurately predictable. However, many of electoral system 
effects are not yet so precisely described as they could be due to their mathematical 
nature. This thesis tries to fill this gap by analysing mechanical effects on 
proportionality and fragmentation – not an easy task as mechanical effects do not exist 
separately from the broader context in which they operate. In the following chapter it is 
explained (1) why it is important to study electoral systems and their mechanical 
effects, (2) why it is so challenging to ascertain precise electoral system effects and (3) 
how to possibly overcome these challenges. 
1.1. Importance of electoral systems 
 
According to the theory of new institutionalism, institutions are important as they 
influence norms, actions and beliefs, and thus affect the outcomes. New institutionalism 
also proposes that institutions are endogenous, which means that their form and 
functioning depends on the conditions in which they emerge and endure (Przeworski 
2004: 527). This work builds on a new institutionalist framework. The notion that 
institutions significantly affect outcomes, but their functioning and precise effects are 
affected by the context, in which they operate, is considered as a theoretical basis of this 
thesis. 
So, it is clear that institutions matter. Electoral systems are part of democratic 
institutions, so they matter too. Of course, like Taagepera (1998) has said, content 
matters more than containers (i.e. institutions). But the latter is still important. Why? 
Because institutions affect the outcome and indirectly they may even go as far as to 
affect the content. According to Taagepera, it is false to ask whether institutions (incl. 
electoral systems) matter or not, the question should be instead how much they matter 
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and how (Taagepera 1998: 68). The following section tries to briefly open those 
questions. 
There is a connection between institutional inputs and political outputs. One of the 
important institutional inputs is the electoral system, which influences political outputs, 
such as the number of parties in the party system. Studying electoral system effects 
helps to improve our understanding of the connection between these aforementioned 
inputs and outputs (Taagepera 2007: v). This is the main reason why it is important to 
discover in quantitative detail how electoral systems work. 
First of all, it is necessary to clarify, what an electoral system is. An electoral system is 
essentially a set of rules. It specifies the ballot structure and the mechanism how votes 
are translated into seats. Because of the latter, the system must at least specify the 
electoral districts, the district magnitude and the seat allocation formula. So, when 
analysing electoral system mechanical effects, all these three components of the system 
must be taken into account. 
Differences in those three seat allocation components, i.e. how votes are translated into 
seats, can lead to drastically different outcomes (Taagepera 2007: 2). Electoral systems 
as important institutional inputs can influence the political output in a variety of ways. 
The most straightforward influence is that electoral systems determine who gets into the 
representative assembly and into the governing cabinet. This means, electoral systems 
directly affect the answer to the question “Who governs?” (Taagepera 2007: 1). This 
can be considered as an electoral system direct influence. As a result of this direct 
effect, the electoral system can encourage or discourage the rise of new parties, 
determining the number of parties competing in the elections and thus, in long term, 
shape the main characteristics of the political system and the nature of party 
competition.   
To go even further, the electoral system has a role to play in shaping the broader 
political culture in the country, because the nature of party competition and political 
system characteristics may influence the political culture significantly. As an example, 
an electoral system that strongly encourages new parties to enter the party competition 
may lead to excessive parliament fractionalisation. This again may lead to the kind of 
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political system where in every election we see new parties, new winners and a very 
little continuity between two governments. This instability definitely affects broader 
attitudes, beliefs and sentiments in the country, which to put it very simply, constitute 
the political culture. It is important to emphasise that this is a two-way process – the 
political culture also (maybe even more importantly) influences the political system. 
This may mean that in our example where the electoral system is extremely favourable 
to new parties, the political system might still be relatively stable because of a mature 
political culture where people highly value stability, which reflects in their voting 
behaviour. 
Stable electoral systems, according to Taagepera (1998), consist not only of rules, but 
also of the way these rules are used in the democratic culture. This democratic culture 
again includes some concern for stability, but also avoidance of miscalculations that 
result from limited knowledge about the effects of given electoral rules. This 
understanding of the effects of electoral rules comes with time (Taagepera 1998: 71). So 
it is evident that electoral systems in longer term influence significantly voters’ 
behaviour and the political culture of the country. 
Electoral systems can be compared and assessed based on many criteria. Most widely 
used examples of these criteria are electoral system proportionality and two-party or 
multi-party political system (Gallagher 1992: 469), i.e. the number of political parties in 
the party system. Proportionality and number of parties are central in this work as well, 
because they convey in their essence the main importance of the electoral system: 
electoral system effect on the political system and political competition. Distinction 
between proportional and majoritarian systems, is considered as one of the main 
determinants of the nature of political competition. The number of parties in the system, 
on the other hand, gives us a starting point of what the political system is like. 
Electoral systems matter as they influence who governs, determine the nature of 
political competition, the number of parties in the system and even shape the 
characteristics of political culture. There are a considerable number of empirical studies 
that show electoral systems’ influences on a wide array of dependent variables. To point 
out just few, electoral systems have an effect on voter turnout (Singh 2011), voter 
incentives (Cox 1997), incentives of parties and candidates (Carey, Shugart 1995; Cox 
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1990), corruption level (Myerson 1993), representation of women and minorities (Rule, 
Zimmerman 1994), etc. 
In the discussion above some major aspects of why electoral systems matter are 
outlined. This discussion is by no means compete, but should be sufficient to admit that 
it is well worth to study electoral system effects in detail. By doing that, we can 
contribute to better understanding of the political system as a whole. As electoral rules 
are mathematically precise, they should have strongly predictable outcomes. Because of 
the mathematical nature of electoral rules, as well as the fact that the central data for 
electoral studies are in quantitative form (numbers of votes and seats), there is a good 
opportunity to carry out a quantitative analysis of electoral system effects (Taagepera, 
Shugart 1989: xi). But as outlined before, electoral systems often have indirect effects 
and the political system is also influenced by many other factors, so it may be tricky to 
analyse the effects produced by electoral rules only. The rest of this chapter deals with 
the difficulties of ascertaining pure electoral system mechanical effects and gives some 
examples of how to overcome these obstacles. 
1.2. Psychological effects blur the picture 
 
We are interested in analysing direct electoral system effects on electoral outcomes such 
as proportionality and parliament fragmentation. But when doing it, it is important to 
bear in mind that electoral systems do not exist in a vacuum. Electoral outcomes are 
also significantly influenced by other structures, institutions and broader contextual 
features (Horowitz 2003). Electoral system direct effects come into play when votes 
have to be translated into seats. But other factors may influence the composition of 
votes, i.e. the electoral input, in the first place. Electoral system direct mechanical 
effects are thus influenced by its indirect effects as well as contextual features. In this 
section it is briefly explained how these indirect effects together with contextual 
features blur the pure mechanical effects of electoral systems. 
As proposed by Duverger (1951), electoral systems have psychological and mechanical 
effects. Mechanical effects refer to how votes are translated into seats, psychological 
effects, on the other hand, shape how parties and voters react to the limits set by 
electoral rules (Duverger 1959: 224). This means that mechanical effects occur after the 
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vote, but psychological effects before or at the moment of the vote (Blais et al. 2011: 
1600). 
Taking this Duvergerian distinction between electoral system effects into account, it is 
evident that the precise mathematical nature of electoral system effects holds true only 
when speaking of mechanical effects. The definition of electoral systems as sets of rules 
that determine how votes are translated into seats already refers to this mechanical 
aspect. Psychological effects of electoral systems, on the other hand, are not 
mathematically precise and thus also much harder to ascertain.  
Logically, it should be relatively easy to ascertain electoral system mechanical effects, 
because the mathematical rules should produce an accurately predictable outcome. But 
as the electoral system input, i.e. votes, are influenced by psychological effects, it may 
blur the picture and overshadow mechanical effects. It definitely is the case when 
analysing electoral system effects on proportionality, because proportionality is affected 
both by votes and seats, where former is influenced by psychological effects, but latter 
is a result of electoral system mechanical effects. 
According to Blais and Carty (1991), upon analysing electoral system psychological 
effects it is useful to distinguish effects on parties and on voters. Electoral system 
psychological effects on voters mean mainly the influence on voters’ strategic 
considerations. To put it simply – voters make different choices under different electoral 
rules (Blais et al. 2011: 1600). Yet this claim is only valid when talking about strategic 
voters, i.e. voters who vote for those parties that they believe have a good chance of 
getting elected. The other two types of voters (using Marsh and Franklin (1996) 
typology), sincere and protest voters are not influenced by electoral system 
psychological effects in the same way. Sincere voters vote for their most favourable 
party even if it does not have a chance of getting elected – electoral system 
psychological effects do not come into play. Assessing electoral system psychological 
effects on protest voters is difficult as their incentives for casting a protest vote may be 
very different and only one of them is a protest against electoral system.  
Electoral system psychological effects also affect parties, i.e. the political supply side. 
Similarly to (strategic) voters, parties also change their behaviour as a reaction to 
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electoral system mechanical impact (Blais et al. 2011: 1600). While voter behaviour 
essentially means for which party she casts her vote, parties have more repertoires. 
Electoral system psychological effects may change party elite incentives to form or 
dissolve a party, to run or not to run candidates, to stand in some districts but not in 
others, to form alliances or merge with other parties etc. It is clear that these 
psychological effects on parties also influence the set of choices available for voters. If 
there are only two or three parties competing because of the majoritarian electoral 
system effect, then voters have much less to choose from than in a country where 
proportional representation system is used and where also many smaller parties decide 
to run in elections. 
To sum up, according to Blais et al. (2011) there are three kinds of electoral system 
effects. Firstly, mechanical effects, which are further analysed in this thesis, and which 
determine the distribution of seats. Secondly, there are psychological effects on voters, 
which influence the distribution of votes. And thirdly, there are psychological effects on 
parties, which affect the number of competitors. As Blais and others put it, the total 
effect of electoral system is the following (Blais et al. 2011: 1602): 
Total effect = Mechanical effect + Psychological effect (voters)+ Psychological effect (parties) 
 
When psychological effects of electoral systems occur before or at the moment of the 
vote and mechanical effects after it, it is obvious that for a complete understanding of 
electoral system effects we must also look “inside” the vote, not only at how votes 
become into seats. It means we need to study what incentives and calculations are 
behind voters’ choice and what strategies parties use and why. This is in fact an 
enormous field of study in political science. Furthermore, these incentives and 
strategies, i.e. psychological effects are constantly changing and somewhat different 
from one election to another. Thus conducting a comprehensive comparative study of 
electoral system mechanical effects, with psychological effects accurately included into 
the analysis, is very ambitious and I would even say impossible.  
Resulting from the above discussion, it should be understandable that for analysing 
electoral system mechanical effects, inevitably some simplifications have to be made. 
One cannot take into account everything, so concessions are necessary. But these 
concessions have to be thought-out and they must be kept in mind when interpreting 
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results. In the following section, some ways how scholars have made those 
simplifications and how they have analysed “pure” mechanical effects are discussed.  
1.3. Analysing “pure” mechanical effects 
 
For the previously mentioned reasons, it is not an easy task to ascertain the electoral 
system mechanical effects. But since we need to do it in some way to analyse the effects 
on proportionality and fragmentation, we must find the best method. The analysis can 
be performed by studying individual countries or by comparing electoral outcomes 
across countries, which is the most common way in the literature. Alternative and much 
less common methods for this widely used approach are experiments, which can be 
either natural (e.g. comparing outcomes before and after electoral system change) or 
lab- or quasi-experiments (e.g. based on questioning voters how they would have voted 
under different electoral systems) (Blais et al. 2012: 829-830). The following section 
discusses these options for analysing “pure” mechanical effects, highlights their 
limitations and proposes an alternative. 
Focusing on an individual country and its electoral system is one way to analyse 
electoral system effects. This essentially means carrying out a comprehensive case 
study. This way it is possible to concentrate on both the electoral outcomes as well as on 
the specific context in which the system operates. Furthermore, it is important that 
someone compiles country’s election results and describes electoral system in detail 
throughout its historical unfolding (Taagepera, Shugart 1989: 61). But the greatest 
drawback in this type of a study is that it can say hardly anything about how different 
electoral systems work. Analysing only one country and its system makes it impossible 
to draw any broader conclusions about electoral system mechanical effects. But it 
definitely is the first important stage in electoral studies, after which comparative 
insights can be applied (Ibid.). 
Comparing electoral outcomes across countries is the most widely used approach in 
studying electoral system mechanical effects. It has its merits, but also some significant 
shortcomings. By comparing electoral outcomes, it is possible to classify the various 
electoral systems worldwide and make some general conclusions about their mechanical 
effects. But the most important shortage of this method is that it ignores the second new 
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institutionalist proposition that context is important. By only focusing on electoral 
outcomes, the conditions in which the electoral system operates are overlooked. 
Furthermore, as Blais and colleagues have said, the observed differences in outcomes 
might be due to other characteristics that are correlated with electoral systems (e.g. PR 
may be more common in more heterogeneous settings) (Blais et al. 2012: 829).  
Carrying out a so-called “natural experiment” is a unique but good method to ascertain 
electoral system mechanical effects. There are two kinds of natural experiments. Firstly, 
a natural experiment can mean comparing electoral outcomes before and after electoral 
change. The second option is to analyse electoral outcomes of two simultaneous 
elections that use different electoral systems. Basically it means that there are some rare 
instances of electoral change or simultaneous elections and scholars use these golden 
opportunities for ascertaining electoral system mechanical effects. According to Blais et 
al. (2012), under a natural experiment of electoral system change one can be confident 
that the differences in outcomes are not due to other societal factors, because we are 
dealing with the very same society (Blais et al. 2012: 829). Some problems still remain 
– one cannot rule out the possibility that there were other factors changing together with 
electoral system. Furthermore, these kind of electoral changes to electoral system are 
rare and thus the number of cases is limited (Ibid.). 
To overcome these aforementioned shortcomings, there is a possibility not to wait for 
those “natural experiments” to happen, but to carry out a lab or quasi-experiment. These 
kinds of experiments are based on questioning voters how they would have voted under 
different electoral systems (Blais et al. 2012: 829-830). A lab experiment means that 
people are invited to vote in different elections under different electoral systems and 
then the outcomes are compared by the researcher. A quasi experiment is similar to the 
lab experiment, with the difference that people are invited to vote in a number of 
elections, but in a “real” election campaign context (Ibid.). These methods allow us to 
hold the context in which electoral systems operate under control, but they still have 
significant shortcomings. One of the problems is similar to the “natural experiment” and 
that is data availability – carrying out a considerable amount of lab or quasi experiments 
among voters (and maybe even parties) takes a lot of effort and money. Furthermore, it 
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is questionable whether people behave in the same way in the real world as under the 
experiment.  
It is evident that electoral system effects (both psychological and mechanical) vary 
across cases (Bodet et al. 2013: 2). Reasons for those variations are related to contextual 
features, such as social divisions, the age of democracy, citizen experience with the 
system, the strength of preferences, the entry of new parties etc.  
One of the options to analyse “purer” mechanical and psychological electoral system 
effects is to hold those aforementioned contextual features constant (Ibid.: 3). It is quite 
hard to do without carrying out a quasi experiment (as Blais et al. did in 2012), because 
it is important how voters and parties would behave under different electoral systems in 
the same context. But another way to hold the context constant it is to carry out a 
“computational experiment”. The logic of this kind of experiment is best summarised by 
Blais et al. (2011: 1600): 
“To ascertain the mechanical effect, we determine how different final outcomes 
(that is, the number of seats won by the various parties) would have been if we 
let the electoral system vary while keeping constant the vote distribution.” 
This method is by no means perfect. However, effectively, it allows us to hold the 
psychological effects under control. This simplification allows us to presume that 
context remains constant when the input side (competing parties and the vote 
distribution between them) is held constant. This approach is described in detail in 
Chapter 3. 
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2. Proportionality and fragmentation 
 
Being interested in the relationship between proportionality and fragmentation of 
electoral outcomes leads us to the very basis of the debate between the proponents of 
majoritarian and proportional electoral systems. Proportional electoral systems are 
associated with the ideal of high representativeness and high proportionality, while 
majoritarian systems lead to the ideal of stable and accountable governments by 
reducing the number of parties (i.e. fragmentation). At the core of the debate is the 
trade-off between representation and accountability and the tacit assumption that this 
trade-off is absolute. This section gives an overview of this trade-off and of the central 
concepts in this thesis – proportionality and fragmentation. 
2.1. Trade-off between representation and accountability 
 
There has been a long history of the debate over evaluating outcomes of electoral 
systems. The main line in this debate has been related to the differences between 
plurality and list PR systems and which one of these two is better. The widespread 
consensus in the literature is that there is no such thing as the ideal electoral system 
(Carey, Hix 2011: 383). PR and plurality systems have inherently competitive values 
and ideals, so one must make an inevitable trade-off when choosing an electoral system. 
In the plurality-PR debate there are two major arguments. Firstly, plurality rule 
proponents see as its great advantage that it produces, at least more likely than PR, a 
firm and accountable government (Lijphart, Grofman 1984: 5). Moreover, with this 
kind of a firm, one-party government a more broad ideal is pursued – the ideal of 
stability (Carey, Hix 2011: 383). So, plurality rule leads to a stabile and accountable 
government by reducing the number of parties that make it into the parliament. The 
second main argument, proposed by PR proponents, is that a democratic legislature 
should be a microcosm of the views and interests in the electorate, i.e. representative, 
and thus proportionality is even considered “virtually synonymous with electoral 
justice” (Lijphart 1984: 140).  
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The central trade-off in electoral system design is therefore between the accountability 
of government and representation of voters’ preferences (Carey, Hix 2011; Powell 
2000). Every country has to choose which ideal they care about most. If they choose 
that they want an accountable and stable single-party government, majoritarian system 
is the best. But if they care most about having a highly representative parliament where 
the pluralism of opinions in the society is represented, proportional representation 
electoral system suits best (Carey, Hix 2011: 383). 
It seems to be quite straightforward that those two democratic ideals, stabile and 
accountable government on the one hand and representative legislature on the other 
hand, cannot coexist. These ideals are indeed inherently competitive. The larger the 
proportionality, the more fragmented and unstable is the composition of the parliament. 
This basic logic of trade-off between those ideals is vividly formulated by Carey and 
Hix (2011: 383): “You have to choose which you care about most: representation or 
accountable government. You cannot have both, so the mantra goes.” 
There are some doubts in the literature concerning this widely accepted view of clear 
trade-offs. Not all authors agree with the notion that PR and plurality systems should be 
regarded as completely different systems. Lijphart and Grofman say that these 
competing values, such as stability and proportionality, may be differently satisfied by 
different electoral systems and that the dichotomy between PR and plurality is thus 
misleading (Lijphart, Grofman 1984: 4). Along the same lines, Carey and Hix doubt 
that the trade-off between representation and accountability is linear, and they suggest 
that small multimember districts help to maximise these competing objectives – there 
exists a so-called electoral “sweet-spot” (Carey, Hix 2011).  
Carey and Hix (2011: 386) illustrate graphically their concern that accountability-
representation trade-offs are not linear. Their graph (Figure 2.1), where Gallagher’s 
disproportionality index is graphed against the effective number of parties (see Chapters 
2.2; 2.3 and 3.2 for details about conceptualisation and operationalisation of 
representation and accountability), leaves no doubt – the relationship is far from being 
linear. The data are concentrated along the axes, which mean that there is higher 
proportionality in elections with lower fragmentation and vice versa. But there are a 
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large number of observations that score relatively low on both variables (Carey, Hix 
2011: 387).  
Figure 2.1. Trade-off between disproportionality of representation and party 
system fragmentation 
 
Graph by Carey and Hix (2011: 386) 
 
Below is a similar graph as in the article by Carey and Hix (2011), but it uses the data 
from the parliamentary elections of 5 countries only (Figure 2.2). These are the same 
countries that are used in the analysis of this study. Similarly as Carey and Hix 
concluded, we cannot see in this graph a clear negative linear relationship between 
disproportionality and parliament fragmentation. 
This empirical reality is convincing enough to say that the trade-off between 
representation and accountability is not as straightforward as it may seem at first glance. 
It is useful to think of the relationship between accountability and representation “as a 
convex maximization problem rather than as a straightforward trade-off” (Carey, Hix 
2011: 385). So, it is important to study why these intuitively conflicting ideals do not fit 
into the linear model, what is the precise relationship between those phenomena and 
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why. These questions are considered as the main analytical motivation for carrying out 
the experiment in this thesis (Chapters 3 and 4). 
Figure 2.2. Trade-off between disproportionality of representation and party 
system fragmentation for 5 sample countries 
 
2.2. Proportionality of electoral systems 
 
Electoral proportionality is one of the most important electoral outputs. As Gallagher 
has said, when talking about assessment of different electoral systems, the concept of 
proportionality “always comes to the fore” (Gallagher 1991: 33). As it often happens 
with widely used concepts, their precise meaning may get fuzzy. For that reason it is 
important to clarify what exactly we mean by electoral proportionality. Furthermore, 
this section gives some preliminary insights into the proportionality of various electoral 
systems. The related topic of how to measure proportionality is discussed in the next 
chapter (Chapter 3.3). 
Proportionality, to put it simply, means a relationship between seat and vote shares of 
parties (Taagepera 2007: 65). Ideal proportionality would be when all parties competing 
in the election receive the exact same share of seats in the parliament as they won of the 
vote - in other words, when seat shares equal vote shares (Ibid: 66). This situation, 
however, is nearly impossible as it can happen only exceptionally (Gallagher 1991: 33). 
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Why? The short answer would be that the parliament is always much smaller than the 
electorate and parties can only have whole number of seats, not fractions. For instance, 
if we have 1 million votes and 100 seats, we would need votes for every party to be 
divisible by exactly 10000 for to achieve a perfect proportionality. Otherwise, perfect 
proportionality becomes impossible. If a party gets 15000 votes, it would mean 1.5 seats 
in this hypothetical example – but in real life, a party can only have either 1 or 2 seats 
and this already means that some deviation from perfect proportionality is inevitable. 
For the reason that perfect electoral proportionality hardly ever occurs, it is more useful 
to talk about disproportionality rather than proportionality. Disproportionality means 
deviation from the perfect proportionality. Even most proportional electoral systems 
have some deviation from proportionality, which means some degree of 
disproportionality is inevitable (Gallagher 1991: 33). 
Using the concept of disproportionality, different electoral systems can be assessed 
based on how proportional outcomes they produce on average. It is important to 
emphasise that the proportionality of the outcome depends on the input (i.e. vote 
shares), but nevertheless, some generalisations about average proportionalities of 
various electoral systems can be made. Lijphart 1986 have ranked the most common PR 
electoral systems based on how proportional outcomes they generally produce. 
Lijphart’s (1986: 178) ranking is the following (systems that are included into analysis 
of this thesis are highlighted in boldface): 
1. Largest remainders (Hare) 
2. Single-transferable vote 
3. Sainte-Lague 
4. Imperiali largest remainders 
5. D’Hondt 
6. Imperiali highest averages  
 
It is clear that proportionality (or disproportionality) of an electoral system is influenced 
by the specific seat allocation formula. But it would be misleading to think that all or 
most of the deviation from proportionality can be attributed to the formula. Other main 
sources of disproportionality are, according to Gallagher, distribution of votes between 
the parties, district magnitude, the possibility of malapportionment, and the use of 
thresholds (Gallagher 1991: 43). Gallagher (1991), Taagepera and Shugart (1989) and 
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many others emphasise most the importance of district magnitude, saying that it is the 
major determinant of proportionality. District magnitude directly influences the 
proportionality of the electoral outcome, because the larger the district magnitude, the 
more closely each party’s seat share tends to correspond to its vote share (Taagepera, 
Shugart 1989: 19). 
Following this logic that the district magnitude is the most important determinant of 
how proportional outcomes the system produces, there is a clear difference between 
majoritarian and PR electoral systems. It is widely accepted in the electoral studies 
literature that PR systems are generally quite successful in achieving reasonably 
proportional translation of votes into seats, which is essentially their principal goal 
(Lijphart 1986: 170). This is especially so in comparison with plurality and majority 
formulae (Ibid.). According to Rae’s proposition, PR formulae tend to allocate seats 
more proportionally than majority formulae (Rae 1971: 96). So the general conclusion 
is that PR systems produce lower levels of disproportionality than majoritarian electoral 
systems. It is also known, both from theoretical literature and empirical analyses, that 
different PR formulae produce different outcomes of proportionality (Lijphart 1986: 
170). This means that not all PR systems are equally proportional.  
Deviation from proportionality is an important characteristic of the entire electoral 
system, and it can be used for comparing different countries and their electoral systems. 
But the mere deviation from proportionality does not tell us whether the system 
advantages large or small parties (Taagepera 2007: 70). Even though higher 
proportionality and whether the system is less favourable towards larger parties usually 
go hand in hand, it is important to bear in mind that this is not always the case.  
Gallagher (1992) has done the analysis comparing 11 different electoral systems and 
ranked them based on how favourable these systems are to larger parties. From the most 
favourable to larger parties to the least favourable, the order is the following (systems 
that are included into analysis of this thesis are highlighted in boldface) (Gallagher 
1992: 490): 
1. Imperiali highest averages 
2. LR-Imperiali 
3. D’Hondt 
4. STV 
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5. Largest remainders-Droop 
6. Largest remainders-Hare/Sainte-Lague 
7. Equal proportions 
8. Danish 
9. Adams 
 
In this analysis, we might expect (according to Gallagher 1992 and Lijphart 1986 
rankings) to see higher proportionality when largest remainders-Hare or Sainte-Lague 
system is used, compared to d’Hondt or largest remainders-Droop, because the former 
two are less favourable to winning parties. 
2.3. Fragmentation of the parlament 
 
Another crucially important electoral output along with proportionality is the number of 
parties. This means how many parties there is in a party system. Is there a two-party or a 
multi-party system in the country? It is a very important question as two-party systems 
have remarkably different characteristics from systems with many parties.  
According to Taagepera (2007), the number of parties is one of the most frequently used 
numbers in political analysis, and it is central to the study of party systems. It is 
impossible to describe a party system without giving some idea of how many actors are 
involved (Taagepera 2007: 47). It is even said that the number of parties is “a most 
important feature in a county’s politics and therefore in comparative studies also” 
(Taagepera, Shugart 1993: 455). The number of parties is directly related to the concept 
of fragmentation. The larger the number of parties, the higher the party system 
fragmentation. This section briefly discusses the importance of the concept of 
fragmentation as an electoral system output. 
From the previous discussion we saw that majority and plurality electoral systems 
produce firm accountable governments, at least when compared to PR systems. 
According to Carey and Hix, PR systems can, indeed, produce broad and fractious 
coalitions (Carey, Hix 2011: 384). Some scholars have said that a large fractionalisation 
tends to destabilise a political system (Duverger 1954), but some have said it does not 
(Lijphart 1968). We can see empirical evidence from both sides. So, we cannot judge 
whether large fragmentation of the party system is generally a good or a bad thing. But 
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according to the proponents of “accountability” ideal, the least fragmented government 
and parliament is the most desirable electoral outcome. 
There are many factors that determine the party system fragmentation. It is influenced 
by history, institutions, current issues etc. But according to Taagepera and Shugart, the 
major determinant is the district magnitude, i.e. the number of seats allocated in the 
single district (Taagepera, Shugart 1993: 455). This argument is coherent with a widely 
used Duverger rule that one-seat districts tend to lead to a two-party system and 
multiseat districts tend to go with a multiparty system (Duverger 1954). This Duverger 
rule is a good starting point, but it is important to bear in mind that multiseat districts 
can be very different in their size and thus influence the party system fragmentation 
differently. We might expect that within the multiseat category, a larger magnitude 
tends to go with a larger number of parties (Taagepera, Shugart 1993: 455). 
We can talk about different kinds of political fragmentations: fragmentation of the 
whole political system, fragmentation of government, fragmentation of parliament. In 
this thesis, the latter is analysed as it is the most direct electoral system outcome out of 
those three fragmentations. This is the case because as a result of elections, distribution 
of parliamentary seats is determined. It is clear that parliament fragmentation is 
probably correlated to government fragmentation, but there is a mediating mechanism 
of coalition negotiations that influence the precise composition of the government. For 
analysing electoral system direct mechanical effect on fractionalisation, the 
fragmentation of parliament is the most suitable concept. 
Parliament fragmentation essentially means how many parties there are in the 
parliament. The more there are parties in the parliament, the more fragmented it is. But 
a mere nominal number of parties might not be the best way to measure parliament 
fragmentation. Why? Because some parties generally have considerably more seats in 
the parliament than others, which mean they are not equal actors in the parliament. For 
that reason for measuring the parliament fragmentation, party size should be taken into 
account. Precise measures how to do it are discussed in Chapter 3.2. 
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3. Methods, measures and data 
 
From the theoretical analysis it is evident that electoral systems have both mechanical 
and psychological effects. In other words, electoral systems can affect the outcome both 
directly (mechanically) and indirectly (psychologically). Both indirect and direct 
impacts come into play when talking about proportionality and fragmentation. If only 
interested in direct mechanical effects, one somehow needs to hold the indirect 
psychological impact under control. This section gives a detailed description of the 
experimental method how it is done in this thesis. Furthermore, this section introduces 
the indices for measuring proportionality and fragmentation and the data that is used for 
carrying out the experiment. 
3.1. Ascertaining mechanical effects on proportionality and fragmentation 
 
Proportionality is determined by vote shares and seat shares. So, electoral system’s 
direct effect comes into play after votes, i.e. in translation of votes into seats. Electoral 
system’s indirect effect, on the other hand, influences the composition of votes, i.e. 
what are the vote shares like. This logic is represented in the Figure 3.1. To sum up, 
electoral systems influence proportionality directly by mechanically making seats out of 
votes, and indirectly through influencing electoral behaviour which determines the vote 
shares. 
Figure 3.1. Electoral system effects on proportionality 
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Using the analogy, it seems that parliament fragmentation is only influenced by direct 
or mechanical effects. As the fragmentation only depends on how seats are distributed 
among parties and vote shares do not matter, it may lead to the conclusion that only 
mechanical effects matter. But when starting to think about where those seats come 
from in the first place, the answer is – from votes. So, vote shares still seem to matter 
and there is also an indirect psychological effect of electoral systems on parliament 
fragmentation. It is visualised in Figure 3.2.  
Figure 3.2. Electoral system effects on parliament fragmentation 
 
To make it clearer, it is useful to add to the picture how exactly votes and seats are 
connected to both variables (fragmentation and proportionality). As we previously saw, 
votes are problematic – they embody psychological effects that make the study of 
mechanical effects complicated. But we cannot have seats without votes and thus there 
would be no mechanical effects without votes. Figure 3.3 explains how votes and seats 
are exactly related to proportionality and fragmentation. Not surprisingly, 
proportionality is both influenced by psychological and mechanical effects. But now it 
is clearly visualised that parliament fragmentation is also influenced by psychological 
effects, but more indirectly than proportionality and only through the mediation of 
electoral system. 
It should be now visually clear (Figure 3.3) that for analysing “pure” mechanical 
effects, psychological effects must be held under control. But as psychological effects 
occur before or at the moment of the vote, they can be held under control when vote 
shares remain unchanged. So, one way to analyse “pure” mechanical effects is to hold 
the vote shares constant. By holding vote shares constant and altering the electoral 
system, we can see, ceteris paribus, variations in mechanical effects only. 
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Figure 3.3. Electoral system effects on proportionality and fragmentation 
 
The method for ascertaining mechanical effects is the computational experiment. The 
real vote share of an individual election is taken as an input. With this very same input 
an experiment is carried out – what are the seat shares when different electoral systems 
are used? As a result of calculations using different electoral rules, we have many 
different seat distributions for the one vote distribution. And then we repeat the same 
thing for a number of other individual elections, i.e. vote distributions.  
Table 1 contains an example of this computational experiment. The example uses data 
from Estonian 2007 parliamentary elections. This illustrates vividly how different 
electoral systems can purely mechanically produce very different outcomes. In this 
example not a single electoral system out of six produces exactly same outcome with 
the same input. Some of these systems with this particular input produce more 
proportional results than others; and some lead to a more fragmented parliament than 
others. 
If we have many different seat distributions for one vote distribution, we can calculate 
the mechanical effect on proportionality and fragmentation. Precise measures for those 
indicators are outlined in Chapter 3.2. When input side is held constant then the 
variations in proportionality and fragmentation indices can be seen as “pure” 
mechanical effects.  
As the psychological side is held under control, it becomes meaningful to graphically 
analyse the relationship between the indices of proportionality and fragmentation. When 
28 
 
the input was not controlled, there seemed to be no precise relationship between 
proportionality and fragmentation (see again Figures 2.1 and 2.2). But with this 
computational method, we expect to see a clearer pattern between those variables. In 
other words, presuming that with this method we can see “pure” mechanical effects, and 
that those mechanical effects are due to their mathematical nature precisely predictable, 
we should see a clear relationship between proportionality and fragmentation, as they 
are conceptually related. 
Table 1. Estonian 2007 parliamentary election results and seat distributions under 
different electoral systems 
 Votes 
(%) 
Real seat 
distribution 
D’Hondt Sainte-
Lague 
Simple 
Quota 
Droop 
Quota 
M=1 
Party 1 28 31 34 27 28 28 68 
Party 2 26 29 31 28 27 30 33 
Party 3 18 19 19 16 16 20 0 
Party 4 11 10 11 12 12 11 0 
Party 5 7 6 1 9 9 4 0 
Party 6 7 6 5 9 9 8 0 
Party 7 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Party 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
3.2. Measuring proportionality and fragmentation 
 
This chapter deals with measuring proportionality and parliament fragmentation. We 
start with proportionality. As previously discussed, perfectly proportional representation 
is nearly impossible to achieve. Thus, some deviation from perfect proportionality is 
inevitable, so it is important to measure the magnitude of this deviation from 
proportionality. According to Taagepera (2007: 66-67), there are three main indices that 
measure this deviation from proportionality, i.e. deviation of seat shares from vote 
shares. But firstly, another index, Rae index, is briefly discussed, as it is the oldest 
measure of disproportionality. 
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The index proposed by Rae (1967) is called Rae’s deviation (RD). Its formula is the 
following, where vi and si are the vote share and the seat share of party i: 
 
Rae’s index is the oldest measure of deviation from proportionality. The problem with 
this index is that it is too sensitive for small parties. When there is a presence of small 
parties, this index underestimates the disproportionality, i.e. produces too low value. 
Secondly, there is an index proposed by Loosemore and Hanby (1971) with the 
following formula: 
 
Loosemore-Hanby index takes always higher values than Rae’s index. The main 
problem with Loosemore-Hanby index is its vulnerability to paradoxes. But the 
Loosemore-Hanby’s advantage over Rae’s index is that it does not have to disaggregate 
“other” small parties, i.e. it is not too sensitive for small parties.  
Loosemore-Hanby index was a dominant way to measure the deviation from 
proportionality until Gallagher introduced a new index in 1991. It is often called a “least 
square” index (LSq): 
 
In this thesis, Gallagher LSq is used for measuring electoral system disproprotionality. 
It has been the most widely used measure of proportionality in political science studies 
after it was introduced in 1991. According to Lijphart (1994), this index is “the most 
faithful reflection of disproportionality of election results”. While some indices produce 
in some cases too high values (e.g. Loosemore-Hanby) or too low values (e.g. Rae 
index), this LSq is a “happy medium”, as said by Gallagher (1991). 
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The fourth option for measuring deviation from proportionality is to calculate the 
largest single difference for any party, let’s call it “largest deviation” (LD): 
 
The beauty of this index is its simplicity. According to Lijphart (1994), who proposed 
this index, the LD is the simplest way of measuring disproportionality. But for the 
purposes of this study, this index is not as suitable as Gallagher’s, because we need a 
more comprehensive measurement of disproportionality. Taking into account only the 
largest single deviation for any party is not enough to make broad conclusions about the 
electoral system effects. 
Another central variable in this analysis is the parliament fragmentation, which means 
the number of parties in the parliament.  How to operationally define the number of 
parties may sound as an absurd question as the answer seems to be obvious. The 
number of parties can be simply counted – how many parties are registered in the 
country, how many parties compete in the elections, how many parties are in the 
parliament – depending on what we want to know. In this work, we are interested in the 
latter two. But if there are, for instance, two strong parties and a lot of small marginal 
parties competing in the elections, it can be misleading to take them all into account as 
equal. Then it would seem useful to use the number of “relevant” parties instead (Sartori 
1976). But how to measure this “relevant” number of parties? 
Basically, we want to somehow measure a meaningful number of parties in the 
parliament, when some parties have a lot of seats and some few. Furthermore, how to 
measure the number of parties in an election, when some get a considerably larger vote 
share than others? So, the number of both electoral and parliamentary parties should be 
measured in a way that takes into account their relative size.  
There are some different ways how to take into account parties’ relative size when 
measuring the number of parties. One method is to take into account the relative size of 
the largest party only. The formula is as follows: 
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The inverse of the largest party vote share represents the smallest number of “relevant” 
parties (Taagepera 2007: 48). This is clearly more realistic than a mere nominal number 
of parties, but it underestimates the number of parties (Ibid.). So, counting the nominal 
number of parties overestimates the number of “relevant” parties and calculating N 
based on the relative size of the largest party underestimates this number. The effective 
number of parties (introduced by Laakso and Taagepera 1979) yields a value of N 
somewhere in between. Laakso-Taagepera effective number of (1) parliamentary and 
(2) electoral parties is the following: 
(1)  (2)  
This measure is most widely used to express the number of parties, as it takes into 
account the relative size of the components in a meaningful way. Using this measure, 
one can express the number of components “for any system of qualitatively similar 
components which differ in size” (Laakso-Taagepera 1979: 23). As it is important to 
take into account the relative size of parties when analysing parliament fragmentation, 
this index suits best for operationalising and measuring fragmentation in this thesis. 
3.3. Context matters – taking it into account 
 
The concept and measurement of electoral system proportionality are problematic, 
because they only look at the relationship between vote and seat shares. But this does 
not entail the whole essence of proportionality. In the literature, when talking about 
(dis)proportionality, the discussion is mainly focused on the direct effects of electoral 
systems, i.e. scholars are concerned how proportionally votes are translated into seats 
(e.g. Gallagher 1991). But I would argue that this kind of (dis)proportionality cannot be 
presented as a pure “electoral system (dis)proportionality”, because it also embodies 
electoral systems’ indirect psychological effects, which are influenced by voters’ 
strategies and preferences and a supply side (see Figure 3.4).  
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Figure 3.4. Electoral system mechanical and psychological effects on 
proportionality and fragmentation 
 
There are only some rare instances of scholarly works that do not see 
(dis)proportionality as a mere vote-seat share relationship. Powell and Vanberg (2000) 
use a similar logic about the nature of (dis)proportionality as this thesis. They say that 
the starting point of the analysis of disproportionality should not be votes, but already 
the voters’ preferences (Powell, Vanberg 2000). 
This way we can explain why the very same electoral system in the same country can 
produce a quite different disproportionality index value from one election to another. 
Not to even mention differences across countries with same electoral system. The 
explanation lies in the input (vote shares) and in the psychological effects that are 
behind this particular input. From one election to another and from one country to 
another, voters’ strategic considerations may vary considerably. And these variations 
lead to differences in electoral outcomes. 
Starting the analysis of both proportionality and parliament fragmentation from voters’ 
preferences and strategies takes us too far from our original goal. Moreover, it would 
certainly be too ambitious for a MA project.  For simplification purposes, it seems 
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reasonable to create a model that takes into account the importance of electoral 
behaviour and contextual features without actually analysing them in detail.  
One meaningful way to take context into account is to normalise the values of LSq and 
Ns. We can do it, because both indicators have their logical minimal and maximal 
values, or to use Taagepera’s (2008) terminology, anchor points. As maximal values of 
LSq and Ns depend on the input (vote distribution), then by normalising using these 
maximal values, the context is taken into account. Logically, it means that for every 
vote distribution, the maximal values of LSq and Ns are different. Furthermore, by 
doing normalisation, different electoral inputs and experiments carried out with them 
become comparable. This means, we can meaningfully put all the cases on the same 
graph, because their LSq and Ns values are now normalised. 
How to normalise LSq and Ns? First, we need to fixate logical anchor points, both 
maximum and minimum points. With the minimum points, there is no long story. LSq 
minimal value is 0 when there is a perfect proportionality – seat shares are equal to the 
vote shares. Ns minimal value is 1, because there must be at least one party in the 
parliament. 
Ascertaining logical maximum values of LSq and Ns is more complex. As previously 
mentioned, maximum values depend on the context, i.e. vote distribution. So, there are 
no universal maximum values of Ns and LSq for all cases. Every vote distribution has 
its own LSqmax and Nsmax. 
Maximal value of disproportionality index (LSq) could be achieved in the situation 
where a party that received 0% of votes gets 100% of seats and the parties that actually 
received votes get no seats at all. But this situation is not possible in the case of 
democratic elections. And as we are interested only in democratic elections and 
democratic electoral systems, using this maximum would not make sense. To leave this 
undemocratic extreme out, the highest degree of disporportionality under the democratic 
rule would be in the situation where the winning party gets all seats and all others are 
left out. This would be so even if the winning party received only mere 10-20% of the 
popular vote. In this case, the maximal value of LSq would be very high. But when the 
winning party receives around 60-70% of the popular vote, the maximal value of LSq 
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will be much lower. So it is clear that the maximal value of LSq depends on the vote 
distribution, mainly on the winning party’s vote share. 
Maximal value of the parliament fragmentation (Ns) could be the number of parties that 
compete in the elections. But as we saw, it is important to take into account the parties’ 
relative strength, not merely nominal number. Competing parties’ relative strength can 
be taken into account when using, again, effective number of parties. Ns is effective 
number of parties, which reflects how many equal parties there are in the parliament and 
is thus calculated based on seats. The maximal value of Ns, on the other hand, reflects 
how many equal parties are competing in the election and is thus calculated based on 
votes (Nv). To put it differently, if Nv is the maximal value of Ns, then we presume that 
the output (seats) cannot be more fragmented than the input (votes). Ns measures how 
fragmented the parliament is and Nv measures how fragmented the input is. We assume 
that input fragmentation (Nv) sets the upper limit for parliament fragmentation. Ns can 
in very rare instances be higher than Nv, but usually it does not happen. It can occur 
only when an electoral system gives disproportionally more seats to the parties with 
smaller vote shares than for the winning parties. Generally, electoral systems work the 
opposite way, giving disproportionally more seats to the winners.  
Now we have put in place the anchor points. As a next step we need to create a 
normalised model using those anchor points. An example of Estonian 2007 
parliamentary elections is used to explain this process. Minimum points, as we saw, are 
universal for all cases, being 0 for LSq and 1 for Ns. Maximum points depend on the 
input, for Estonian 2007 input, LSqmax is 56.7 and Nv (i.e. Nsmax) is 5.0. We have two 
axes, one ranging from 0 to 56.7 and other from 1 to 5.0. But we want to make a 
normalised model, where both axes range from 0 to 1 and where logical anchor points 
would be in the points (0; 0) and (1; 1). The normalised LSq (1) and Ns (2) axes are the 
following: 
(1)  (2)  
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When LSq equals LSqmax, then 1-(LSq/LSqmax) = 0. This means that if we achieve the 
maximal value of LSq, then we are dealing with the anchor point where the Ns value is 
minimal.   But when LSq equals 0, then 1-(LSq/LSqmax) gets its maximal value of 1. In 
this case, we are dealing with another anchor point, where also the Ns value is maximal 
(see Figure 3.5). Upon normalising, we turned LSq around, because we wanted the 
anchor points to be (0; 0) and (1; 1) instead of (1; 0) and (0; 1) as the former are 
mathematically easier to work with. Now we have to interpret the LSq' axis in the 
opposite way – the higher the LSq', the more proportional is the outcome and vice versa. 
Figure 3.5. Normalised Ns and LSq axes and anchor points 
 
Now it is possible to calculate for every data point its normalised value. We also know 
the anchor points, where the graph should start and end. After carrying out the 
experiment and calculating the normalised values for all data points, we should be able 
to see the relationship between LSq and Ns more precisely, because the context (i.e. 
vote shares) are held under control. If we are on a right track with this logic, we should 
be able to see relatively pure electoral system mechanical effects and thus there should 
be a clear pattern between LSq and Ns normalised values. The questions when 
analysing the results of the experiment are the following: Is there a pattern between Ns 
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and LSq normalised values? If yes, what kind of pattern? Why? Those questions are 
addressed in Chapter 4. 
3.4. Cases, data and systems 
 
For carrying out the computational experiment, a real dataset of five counties and 10 
elections was used: Czech Republic (2002, 2006), Denmark (2007, 2011), Finland 
(2003, 2007), Portugal (2009, 2011) and Estonia (2007, 2011). For district level vote 
shares for all these elections, CLEA (The Constituency-Level Elections Archive) 
dataset was used. CLEA dataset includes detailed election results at the constituency 
level for parliamentary elections around the world. For the experiment in this thesis, 
CLEA provided data about constituency level votes for individual parties, seats won by 
each party and district magnitudes. 
Cases included in the analysis were chosen based on many criteria. The most important 
criterion was that all countries in the sample should use proportional electoral system. 
Why? Had we included majoritarian systems, then there might have been some 
problems carrying out the experiment. For instance, when only 3 parties receive votes, 
then it might not be meaningful to do calculations with different PR electoral systems, 
as the results may be too similar. 
Secondly, when choosing countries, the main characteristics of their electoral systems 
and electoral outcomes were taken into account. We mainly looked at the average value 
of disproportionality index in the last decade and tried to include into the sample 
countries with low, medium and high disproportionality (see Table 2). Even though all 
sample countries use PR electoral systems which try to minimise the disproportionality, 
some systems still achieve more proportional results than others. We can see that 
average disproportionality index ranges from 1.3 to 7.4, a relatively big variation 
considering that all those countries use PR electoral systems. 
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Table 2. Average value of disproportionality index in 1990-2013 in 5 sample 
countries 
Country 
Average LSq 
(1990-2013) 
Denmark 1,34 
Finland 3,27 
Estonia 5,19 
Portugal 5,33 
Czech Republic 7,37 
Source: average LSq is calculated using Gallagher election indices dataset 
Finally, but even most importantly, the selection of cases was limited by data 
availability. For carrying out the computational experiment, it was necessary to get the 
vote shares for all parties in every district, not just aggregate vote shares. Also, it was 
necessary to know district magnitudes. The CLEA dataset we used did not allow us to 
include into the analysis some countries that were initially planned to. That was because 
of large amount of missing values in the dataset. Collecting these missing values from 
the websites of national electoral committees would have been too time-consuming. 
Also, originally, the plan was to include into the analysis the two latest parliamentary 
elections from each country, but for many countries there was no latest update in the 
CLEA database. So instead, last two elections in the database were included. The only 
exception is Estonian 2011 elections that were not in the database, but because of 
personal interest, the data were collected from the national election committee website 
and included into analysis. 
Extracting real data from CLEA database for five countries and 10 cases was the 
starting point for carrying out the experiment. This real input was used to calculate new 
seat distributions under various electoral rules. For each of the 10 elections, results were 
calculated under at least six different electoral rules. It means that one vote distribution 
was used as an input for six different electoral systems. By doing that, we obtained 
seven seat distributions for one seat distribution (one real and six experimental seat 
distributions). In many cases all of these seven seat distributions differed from each 
other, but not always. Still, there were at least 5 different seat distributions for every 
vote distribution. In total, 79 different seat distributions were obtained from the 
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experiment (including real seat distributions). The seven electoral systems used in the 
experiment were the following: 
1) D’Hondt 
2) Sainte-Lague 
3) Simple quota and remainders 
4) Droop quota and remainders 
5) M=1 (single seat districts) 
6) M=2 (two-seat districts)
1
 
 
In one case, Czech Republic 2002 election, additionally M=4 and M=7 rules were 
applied. But since the experiment of manipulating the district magnitude was quite time-
consuming, only the more extreme rules of M=1 and M=2 were used for other vote 
distributions. Nonetheless, M=4 and M=7 in the Czech case fitted the pattern described 
in the results section (Chapter 4) very well. 
The aforementioned list contains two types of rules that were used in the experiment. 
Firstly, the electoral formula (i.e. the precise method how votes are transformed into 
seats in the district) and secondly, district magnitude (i.e. how many seats are 
distributed in one district). The electoral formulae in the list can also be classified – 
there are divisor methods (d’Hondt and Sainte-Lague) and largest remainders methods 
(simple and Droop quota).  
Variations in both electoral formulae and district magnitudes were intentional. The 
selection of electoral formulae for the experiment was also influenced by how widely 
the systems are actually used in the real world. The four formulae included in study are 
the most widely used PR seat allocation methods. The selection of district magnitudes 
was guided by the intention to include in the analysis also systems that produce lower 
proportionality scores. And as we know from the electoral system literature, the lower 
the district magnitude, the less proportional results the system produces. For that reason, 
the two lowest possible district magnitudes (1 and 2) were used. 
  
                                                             
1 For calculating results under the M=2 rule, all previous electoral formulae were used (d’Hondt, Sainte-
Lague, simple and Droop quota), but the results were generally the same in all cases or just one was 
different from others. So, the M=2 rule sometimes gave us just one seat distribution (same for all 
formulae), but sometimes two and in one case three seat distributions. 
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4. Results and analysis 
4.1. Non-linear relationship between proportionality and fragmentation 
 
As expected, when context (i.e. vote shares) is held under control, the relationship 
between proportionality and parliament fragmentation becomes clearer. As we saw in 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 in Chapter 2, when the indices of fragmentation and 
disproportionality for different elections with different vote shares are plotted, there 
seems to be no clear relationship between proportionality and effective number of 
parties. But when we hold the vote shares constant and alter only the electoral system, a 
much cleaner pattern appears.  
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate the results of the experimental calculations with input from 
Czech 2002 and Estonian 2007 elections. Even though there are few data points, we see 
that there is a relatively strong negative relationship between disproportionality (LSq) 
and fragmentation (Ns). The lower the value of LSq, the higher fragmentation (Ns) we 
get. A similar pattern appears in all other eight cases, too (Appendix 1).  
Figure 4.1. Results of the computational experiment for Czech Republic 2002 
elections and logical anchor points 
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Figure 4.2. Results of the computational experiment for Estonian 2007 elections 
and logical anchor points 
 
For some of the graphs in the Appendix 1, a linear model seems to fit quite well. But for 
most of them, a linear fit does not seem appropriate. It is visually clear that data points 
deviate from the linear model especially when the value of disproportionality is low. In 
the region of high proportionality and high fragmentation, the graph starts curving up 
more sharply than the linear fit. Furthermore, after adding logical anchor points and 
forbidden zones to these graphs, it becomes more likely that data points may fall on a 
curved model rather than on a straight line.  
In the Appendix 1 there are 10 different Ns – LSq graphs. We cannot plot all cases on 
the same Ns – LSq graph, because then the importance of context would not be taken 
into account. So, for every vote distribution, there has to be a separate Ns – LSq graph. 
But if we use Ns and LSq anchor points and calculate normalised values for Ns and 
LSq, then all the data points can be put on the same graph. It means that normalisation 
of Ns and LSq takes context into account, making all 10 cases comparable. 
Normalised results of the experiment are shown in Figure 4.3 (for precise results of the 
experiment see Appendix 2). From that figure, it becomes obvious that the relationship 
is far from being linear when context is taken into account. In the graph, also a simple 
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linear model (y = x) is shown that connects the logical anchor points (0; 0) and (1; 1). 
Not a single data point falls on that simple model. Furthermore, most of the data points 
are below the prediction line – systematically the value of the “y” is smaller than what 
the linear model would predict. So it is clear that the relationship is not linear, and thus 
the representation-accountability trade-off is not linear either. 
Figure 4.3. Results of the computational experiment, plotted using normalised axes 
 
There are no major outliers in Figure 4.3 and it looks like it would be possible to draw a 
curve (not a linear line) that goes relatively well through all data points. It is necessary 
to find the exact equation for the best fitting curve. It seems that the data points might 
fit on some kind of a y = x
k
 curve. From the equation y = x
k
, “k” can be expressed using 
logarithms: log y = k*log x. So, if we do a log-log plot of normalised Ns and LSq, then 
the slope of the straight line is the exponent “k” we are looking for. This graph is shown 
in Figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4.4. Log-log graph of normalised LSq and Ns 
 
As we see, the log-log linear fit goes almost through point (0; 0), which is a necessary 
condition for saying that the initial curve was in the form of y = x
k
. Furthermore, R
2
 is 
very high, 0.96, which is another necessary condition for the validity of y = x
k 
form. The 
slope of the straight line is 1.7, which means that the relationship between LSq and Ns 
normalised values is y = x
1.7
. 
In the Figure 4.5, it can be seen that the x
1.7 
graph fits well for the data points with 
lowest or highest values on both axes, but not so well for the ones that lie somewhere in 
between. If we look at the log-log graph more closely, then we see that five data points 
flatten the fitted line significantly (these points are highlighted in the Figure 4.4). If 
these data points were excluded from the graph, the linear fit would be steeper, i.e. the 
slope would be higher. But we cannot simply ignore some data points, just for the 
purpose of getting a better fit. So, it would be wise to look up what these five data 
points possibly have in common. 
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Figure 4.5. Mathematically best-fitting curve for normalised LSq and Ns values 
 
It turns out that all these five data points that are highlighted in Figure 4.4 are the results 
of the M=1 experiment. These points are obtained by calculating the alternative seat 
shares for countries that in real life use a PR electoral system if they had used single-
member districts. So it seems that single-member districts produce slightly different 
results in terms of the proportionality-fragmentation relationship. It would then be 
reasonable to check what the log-log graph would look like if all M=1 data points 
(altogether 10 data points, including the five previously highlighted points) were 
excluded (see Figure 4.6). 
The exclusion of M=1 data points for determining the value of exponent “k” is justified. 
Using the input (vote shares) from cases that actually use proportional representation 
(PR) electoral system for M=1 calculations is not very realistic – the input would 
certainly not be so fragmented if single-member districts were used. In real life, if 
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district magnitude was 1, then vote shares would be much less fragmented, Nv would be 
smaller and as a result, parliament would be less fragmented. It means that if we used 
“realistic” M=1 input, data points should have lower values on the Ns axis than in our 
experiment in Figure 4.5. So in this thesis, the y = x
2
 graph is used as a best fit, because 
it is the best fit for PR systems. Even though exponent 2 is not the best fit for M=1 data 
points, these points still do not deviate from the y = x
2
 graph significantly, as can be 
seen in Figure 4.7. 
Figure 4.6. Log-log graph for normalised LSq and Ns, M=1 excluded 
 
When the exponent 2 is used instead of 1.7, the fitted curve y = x
2
 seems to work better 
(see Figure 4.7). The curve is now a better fit for the data points that are in the middle or 
at the higher ends of the axes. The fit is a little less suitable for M=1 data points, as 
expected. But this deviation is not significant. All in all, taking the whole dataset into 
account, y = x
2
 is the best model. 
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Figure 4.7. Best-fitting model for normalised LSq and Ns 
 
For simplicity, we say that the relationship is y = x
2
. But of course, y actually refers to 
normalised Ns and x to normalised LSq: 
 
To be precise, the relationship is therefore the following: 
 
From this relationship, we can express the formula for both (1) fragmentation Ns and 
(2) disproportionality LSq: 
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(1)  
(2)  
There are four variables in these formulae: Ns, Nv, LSq and LSqmax. We are interested in 
the relationship between Ns and LSq, but it is impossible to explain this relationship 
without knowing the context – LSqmax and Nv, which depend on the input. So, the exact 
relationship between LSq and Ns depends on the context. Without knowing the 
maximum values of Ns and LSq, which are different for every vote distribution, the LSq 
– Ns relationship cannot be precisely determined. If the Ns and LSq values are 
normalised (we call their normalised values Ns' and LSq'), then there is a square 
relationship: Ns' = LSq'
2
 
Ns, Nv and LSq are all widely used measures in describing electoral outcomes. LSqmax, 
on the other hand, is not a common measure, it has to be calculated from vote shares if 
one wants to use or test the proposed formula. But it turns out that LSqmax can be 
expressed in terms of Nv and v1 (winning party’s vote share) only. v1 is a much better 
measure than LSqmax, because one can simply look up the winning party’s vote share 
and does not have to calculate the value of LSqmax from scratch, which would take 
significantly more time. LSqmax can be expressed in terms of Nv and v1 in the following 
way: 
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In the initial formula, it is useful to express the value of LSqmax in terms of Nv and v1, 
because Nv and v1 are much more widely used and easier to find than LSqmax. 
To sum up, the relationship between parliament fragmentation and proportionality is 
Ns'=LSq'
2
. And since we know that between non-normalised Ns and LSq there is no 
precise relationship, this squared relationship between Ns' and LSq' proves that the 
context matters. The fact that this Ns'=LSq'
2 
model holds true convinces us that the 
relationship between proportionality and fragmentation is not linear – instead there 
appears to be a square relationship. Furthermore, this formula improves our knowledge 
about how exactly input influences the Ns – LSq relationship. 
But the usefulness of the formula would increase significantly if we could explain why 
the best fit is achieved with the exponent 2, not 2.5, 1.5 or even 1 (i.e. why the 
relationship is not linear). LSq, LSqmax, Ns and Nv can all be expressed in terms of 
votes and seats – this would suggest that the exponent 2 and the LSq-Ns relationship 
more broadly can be somehow explained through vote-seat relationship. We have not 
been able to find such an explanation yet. Because of the summations in the LSq; 
LSqmax and Ns; Nv formulae, this approach is mathematically challenging. But it is 
something that certainly needs to be done in future. 
4.2. Testing the relationship on broader data 
 
Even though we cannot yet explain why the relationship is what it is (Ns' = LSq'
2
), we 
can still examine its validity. We arrived at this formula using the data from only five 
countries and 10 elections. But does this formula still work when tested on broader 
data? 
Carrying out a computational experiment with 10 election inputs took quite some time 
and effort. So, it would be best to test this formula without having to go through all that 
48 
 
trouble again. M. Gallagher has created an election indices dataset where three main 
indices (the values of Ns, Nv and LSq) have been computed for elections all over the 
world. This is a comprehensive dataset and its last updated version (March 4, 2014) is 
used to test the validity of the Ns'= LSq'
2
 formula. 
There are four variables in the formula that we are testing. From Gallagher’s dataset we 
get three. But for testing the validity of the formula we need all four variables. LSqmax is 
the only one that we do not know. As discussed in the previous section, it can be 
expressed in terms of v1 and Nv. The winning party’s vote share (v1) can be looked up 
relatively easily, but if we have a large number of elections, it still takes quite some 
time. In Gallagher’s dataset there are more than 130 countries and indices for more than 
1000 elections. Searching for the winning party’s vote share for a thousand elections 
would be really time-consuming. 
But if we look at the formula (Ns - 1)/(Nv - 1) = (1 - LSq/Lsqmax)
2
, it seems that a 
simplification can be made regarding the value of LSqmax. LSq/LSqmax ranges from 0 to 
1 and it takes the maximal value when the electoral system produces maximal 
disproportionality. Conceptually, when PR electoral systems are considered, their goal 
is to minimise disproportionality (LSq), i.e. make LSq value much smaller than LSqmax. 
In our 10 cases, all of which used PR electoral systems, real LSq values ranged from 3 
to 5%, but LSqmax values varied only from 48 to 59%. Thus, the value of LSq/LSqmax 
would have been between 3/59 = 0.051 and 5/48 = 0.104, which are both at the lower 
end of the continuum 0 – 1. It means that the LSq/LSqmax is much closer to 0 for PR 
systems and the precise value of LSqmax does not influence the value of LSq/LSqmax 
significantly. We can even say that mechanical effects of PR electoral systems are more 
determined by the value of Nv rather than LSqmax as the value of LSq/LSqmax ratio is 
always low and the value of (1 - LSq/LSqmax)
2
 is always close to 1. 
Because of this characteristic of PR systems, we can take the average LSqmax of our 10 
cases and use it for making calculations for all PR systems in Gallagher’s dataset. The 
average LSqmax for our elections turned out to be roughly 50. The formula for PR 
systems is thus the following: 
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To test its validity, we express Ns from it: 
 
Using Gallagher’s Nv and LSq, we can now calculate our formula’s prediction for Ns 
for every PR election in the dataset. Then we can compare our computational Ns to the 
real Ns in the dataset. We extracted from the dataset most of the European countries that 
use a PR electoral system: a total of 28 countries and 340 elections. For all 340 
elections, we calculated the predicted value of Ns. The comparison of real and 
computational Ns is visualised in Figure 4.8. 
Figure 4.8 shows that our formula works very well for PR systems – even the simplified 
version of it, where LSqmax value was simply taken to be the average of our 10 cases. If 
our formula had worked perfectly, then the relationship between the real and 
computational Ns would have been Ns_real = Ns_formula (red line in the Figure 4.8 
symbolises this desired relation). The green line refers to the actual relationship between 
two Ns’s. As we see, the red and green lines almost coincide: Ns_formula = 0.97 * 
Ns_real + 0.03. As 0.97 ≈ 1 and 0.03 ≈ 0, the relationship is roughly Ns_formula = 
Ns_real. It proves that our formula makes almost perfectly correct predictions for PR 
systems. Furthermore, green line’s R2 is very high – 0.97, which means that the data 
points are all very close to this line.  
Upon testing the validity of the formula for plurality electoral systems, the value LSqmax 
needs to be known. For these systems LSq/LSqmax is much higher than for PR systems 
and thus it influences the overall Ns value more significantly. So it is important to use 
the real LSqmax value, not just average value. For that, we use the LSqmax formula: 
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Figure 4.8. Comparison of real and computational Ns for PR systems 
 
To calculate the value of LSqmax, we need to know the values of v1, which are not 
included into Gallagher’s dataset. As looking up v1 for every election takes time, we use 
only two countries that employ a plurality electoral system for testing purposes. These 
countries are Canada and the United Kingdom. In Gallagher’s dataset the election 
indices for these countries have been calculated for elections since 1945 to present. It 
means that for two countries there are 40 elections, a decent amount for testing the 
formula. After looking up the values of v1, we can calculate the LSqmax for each of the 
40 elections. And then it is possible to calculate the Ns value – our model’s prediction 
what the Ns would be.  
Comparing the results of computational Ns and real Ns shows that our model Ns' = 
LSq'
2
 works really well for plurality systems, too (Figure 4.9). Again, the red line 
symbolises the perfect situation of Ns_formula = Ns_real and the green line shows the 
best linear fit for our data points. We see that those two lines are very close to one 
another and the R
2
 is very high. But we also see that our formula tends to predict 
slightly lower Ns values than they are in real life. This is coherent with our initial results 
– we saw that the model Ns' = LSq'
2
 is a best fit for PR systems and that M=1 
experiments deviated slightly from this curve. 
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Figure 4.9. Comparison of real and computational Ns for plurality systems 
 
According to our results in Chapter 4.1., the model Ns' = LSq'
1.7
 was the best fit for 
M=1 experiments. Because of that we calculate the Ns value using the exponent 1.7 
instead of 2 and compare the results again with the real Ns value (see Figure 4.10). In 
the graph, red and green lines coincide with each other almost perfectly. Therefore 
exponent 1.7 really works better than 2 for plurality systems. This claim should 
certainly be further looked into, as currently the testing was done using data from only 
two countries and 40 elections. However, if it really is so and the exponent 2 holds true 
for PR and the exponent 1.7 for plurality systems, it should be investigated why. 
So far, testing the validity of Ns' = LSq'
2
 relationship has suggested that this formula 
predicts the real Ns value quite accurately both for PR and plurality electoral systems. 
However, the formula Ns' = LSq'
2 
should be regarded as a first approximation rather 
than a universal rule. Due to slight differences in the effects of the formula for PR and 
plurality systems, we think that between Ns' and LSq'
 
there is actually not a simple 
squared relationship. In the region of low fragmentation and disproportionality, the 
exponent in the formula Ns' = LSq'
k
 appears to be lower (around 1.7) and in the region 
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of high fragmentation and disproportionality, it appears to be higher (around 2). As the 
difference between those exponents is not overly significant, the simplified 
approximation Ns'= LSq'
2
 can be used to good precision.  
An advanced model that takes into account deviations from Ns' = LSq'
2
 approximation 
for plurality systems should be developed in future. But our first approximate model is 
still probably better for making generalisations about the overall relationship between 
proportionality and fragmentation. 
Figure 4.10. Comparison of real and computational Ns for plurality systems using 
the exponent 1.7 
 
 
4.3. Is there an electoral sweet-spot? 
 
In section 2.1 we discussed how representation and accountability ideals are inherently 
competitive. It means that high proportionality (i.e. high representativeness) goes hand 
in hand with high parliament fragmentation (i.e. low accountability) and vice versa. 
This conflicting nature is also clear from the results of this thesis – there are no data 
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trade-off between those competitive ideals is not linear – there is a squared relationship 
instead. Carey and Hix (2011) also took the position that this trade-off is not linear. 
They believed that it is possible to achieve a representative but still highly accountable 
parliament and called it an “electoral sweet-spot”. 
Conceptually, an “electoral sweet-spot” does not mean high proportionality and low 
fragmentation, which is impossible, but rather the situation where these ideals are 
optimised together. If the trade-off between proportionality and fragmentation was 
linear, it would be impossible to talk about a “sweet-spot” as Ns' and LSq' would always 
increase at the same rate. But since we are dealing with a non-linear squared 
relationship, an “electoral sweet-spot” can be found.  
This “sweet-spot” can be best described graphically. It is situated where the y=x2 curve 
is farthest from the y=x line (see Figure 4.11). In other words, electoral “sweet-spot” is 
where the line that is parallel to y=x line touches the y=x
2
 curve (green line in Figure 
4.11). The same graphical logic is used by Carey and Hix (2011: 386).  
Our ideals are optimised when LSq' is the largest and Ns' is the lowest. Starting from 
point (0; 0) and following the x
2
 curve, the x value increases more than y (desired in 
terms of optimising the ideals) until the point where green line touches the x
2
 line. After 
that point, x starts increasing more slowly than y (not desired). So the optimal balance is 
reached in the “sweet-spot” – i.e. where green line touches x2 curve. 
In the Figure 4.11 we see that the “sweet-spot” is not really a “spot” but rather an 
“optimal region”. Yes, mathematically there is a precise “spot” where the green line 
touches the y=x
2
 curve. But practically speaking, in the region where the y=x
2
 curve is 
farthest from y=x line, the two curves are nearly parallel for a while, so it would be 
meaningful to talk about an optimal region instead. Let us call it an electoral “sweet-
region”. The LSq' and Ns' are optimised in the region where LSq' is around 0.3 to 0.8. 
Most of the M=1 and all of the M=2 cases fall into this range. 
Carey and Hix have suggested that the electoral “sweet-spot” would be achieved by the 
use of low-magnitude multimember districts. According to their results the optimal 
district magnitude is in the range of three to eight (Carey, Hix 2011: 384). In addition to 
Carey and Hix, there are other scholars as well who point to the advantages low-
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magnitude districts. Taagepera and Shugart also recommend using low-magnitude 
multi-seat districts – 3 or 5, but not 4 (Taagepera, Shugart 1989: 236). Samuels (1999) 
say that voters under low-magnitude open-list systems are more able to hold their 
representatives accountable than when other systems are used. 
Figure 4.11. Determining electoral “sweet-spot” 
 
Our results do not agree with what Carey and Hix (2011) expect – the sweetest region 
seems to be achieved when district magnitude is one or two, not in the range of 3-8. 
However, our results may be influenced by how we combine Ns and LSq and are 
possibly slightly different if we normalise Ns and LSq in a different way (e.g. (Nv-
Ns)/Nv and LSq/LSqmax). Nevertheless, it is clear that the “sweet-spot” cannot be 
achieved using magnitudes as high as 6-8 (as Carey and Hix suggested), but rather in 
the range of 1-2 (according to our results) or 3-5, excluding 4 (according to Taagepera 
and Shugart 1989). Carey and Hix were looking for a combination of low 
disproportionality and moderate number of parties (3 to 8), so the emphasis was more 
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on the proportionality ideal – keeping the number of parties not minimal, but moderate. 
But when trying to maximise both ideals equally, the “sweet-spot” seems to be achieved 
using much lower district magnitudes. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis focused on analysing the mechanical effects of electoral systems on two 
important electoral outcomes: proportionality and parliament fragmentation. 
Proportionality and parliament fragmentation refer to the ideals of representation and 
accountability, respectively. These two democratic ideals are at the core of the debate 
between proponents of PR and majoritarian electoral systems. Conceptually, these 
ideals are indeed conflicting: the better the representation (more proportionality), the 
less accountable is the government (more fragmented) and vice versa. Our aim was to 
ascertain the precise relationship between proportionality and fragmentation, as it has 
not been done before. 
The presumption of new institutionalism that institutions matter but their precise effect 
depends on the conditions in which they operate helped us to arrive at a universal 
approximate model for the proportionality-fragmentation relationship. We carried out a 
computational experiment on data from 5 countries and 10 elections with the intention 
to hold context under control. Using the same vote distribution (input) and altering 
electoral rules allowed us to see variations in mechanical effects only. As we had 10 
different inputs in our experiment, the variables were normalised to find a universal 
relationship. By using the values of logical anchor points of each vote distribution (0 
and LSqmax; 1 and Nv) for normalising, we arrived at the following universal 
relationship: 
 
In other words, we found that there is a squared relationship between the normalised 
values of disproportionality (LSq') and parliament fragmentation (Ns'): Ns' = LSq'
2
. This 
is an important finding as the trade-off between high proportionality and low 
fragmentation is often tacitly assumed to be linear. The results of this thesis show 
clearly that the relationship is by no means linear; instead the best first approximation is 
a squared model. 
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It is important to emphasise that the precise relationship between proportionality and 
fragmentation depends on the context, i.e. on the vote distribution. LSqmax and Nv, 
which were used for normalising, are different for every vote distribution. One needs to 
know the vote distribution to make accurate predictions about electoral systems’ 
mechanical effects on proportionality and parliament fragmentation. Without taking 
context into account, there is no clear pattern or universal relationship between LSq and 
Ns and no precise predictions can be made. 
Testing the relationship on broader data confirmed the validity of our approximation Ns'  
= LSq'
2
. With the help of the simplification that LSqmax for PR electoral systems is 
roughly 50%, we were able to test the validity our formula for 340 PR elections. We 
expressed the Ns from our formula and compared the results to real Ns values. For PR 
systems, our formula predicts the value of real Ns very accurately, almost perfectly. For 
majoritarian systems, the simplification regarding LSqmax is not justified: the precise 
value of LSqmax is small enough to influence formula significantly, which was not the 
case for PR systems. To make progress, we expressed LSqmax in terms of Nv and v1 
(winning party’s vote share): 
 
The real Ns was again compared to the computational one, this time using the results of 
40 plurality elections. Once again, our formula predicted the value of Ns very 
accurately. However, for plurality systems, it tends to give slightly lower Ns values than 
they are in real life. This suggests that the formula Ns' = LSq'
2
 holds true for PR 
electoral systems, but for majoritarian systems the exponent in the formula is slightly 
lower (around 1.7). 
These results point to the fact that the formula Ns' = LSq'
2 
should be regarded as a first 
approximation rather than a universal rule. Due to slight differences in the effects of the 
formula for PR and plurality systems, there is not always a simple squared relationship 
between Ns' and LSq'. A more advanced model that takes into account these minor 
deviations should be developed in future. Nevertheless, for making generalisations 
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about the relationship between proportionality and fragmentation, this first 
approximation is good enough and perhaps even better than a more complex model 
would be. 
As the relationship between Ns' and LSq' is nonlinear, the trade-off between LSq and Ns 
is not absolute and thus a “sweet-spot” can be found. An electoral sweet-spot means 
optimising both ideals – having high proportionality and low fragmentation. We found 
that the relationship is optimised in the region where district magnitude is either 1 or 2. 
However, this result needs further investigation and interpretation as this may be 
influenced by the particular normalisation of LSq and Ns. Nevertheless, our results 
suggest that the two democratic ideals are optimised at lower district magnitudes than 
expected by other scholars. 
This thesis leaves an important question open. We found that the approximation Ns' = 
LSq'
2
 holds true relatively well for both PR and majoritarian systems. But why? All the 
variables in the formula can be expressed using vote and seat shares – we suggest that 
there exists some kind of an underlying vote-seat relationship that explains the validity 
of our squared model. It should be definitely further investigated as it may also reveal 
why our electoral “sweet-spot” turned out to be in a region of surprisingly low district 
magnitude. Furthermore, if a more comprehensive model of Ns' and LSq' is developed 
in future, it may also shed some light to this question. 
In conclusion, this thesis revealed a squared relationship between normalised 
proportionality and fragmentation. We also showed that this relationship holds when 
tested on broader data, especially for PR electoral systems. This work is a first step 
towards finding and explaining the precise relationship between LSq and Ns, which is 
something that has remained elusive in previous studies. Given the many new questions 
that naturally arise from this work, the approximate model Ns' =LSq'
2
 forms a good 
starting point for further investigations. Establishing this squared relationship is a strong 
contribution towards better understanding of mechanical effects of electoral systems on 
political outcomes. 
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Appendixes 
Appendix 1. Results of the computational experiments and logical anchor points for 
each sample country and its elections 
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Portugal 2009 
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Estonia 2007 
 
Estonia 2011 
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Appendix 2. Results of the computational experiment by electoral system 
      Ns LSq Nv 
LSq 
max (N-1)/(Nmax-1) 
1-
(LSq/Lsqmax) 
log((N-1)/(Nmax-
1)) 
log(1-
(LSq/Lsqmax)) 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
2002 Real 3,668 5,782 
4,817 54,930 
0,699 0,895 -0,156 -0,048 
  d'hondt 3,668 5,782 0,699 0,895 -0,156 -0,048 
  saint-lague 3,969 3,895 0,778 0,929 -0,109 -0,032 
  simple quota 4,353 3,221 0,878 0,941 -0,056 -0,026 
  droop quota 4,095 3,311 0,811 0,940 -0,091 -0,027 
M=7 d'hondt 3,479 7,452 0,650 0,864 -0,187 -0,063 
  saint-lague 3,731 5,473 0,716 0,900 -0,145 -0,046 
  simple quota 4,065 3,555 0,803 0,935 -0,095 -0,029 
  droop quota 3,808 5,393 0,736 0,902 -0,133 -0,045 
M=4 d'hondt 3,328 9,269 0,610 0,831 -0,215 -0,080 
  saint-lague 3,877 6,047 0,754 0,890 -0,123 -0,051 
  simple quota 3,935 6,760 0,769 0,877 -0,114 -0,057 
  droop quota 3,877 6,047 0,754 0,890 -0,123 -0,051 
M=2 all 4 2,532 19,191 0,401 0,651 -0,397 -0,187 
M=1   1,380 41,642 0,100 0,242 -1,002 -0,616 
2006 Real 3,096 5,719 
3,909 52,356 
0,721 0,891 -0,142 -0,050 
  d'hondt 3,135 5,418 0,734 0,897 -0,134 -0,047 
  saint-lague 3,531 2,417 0,870 0,954 -0,060 -0,021 
  simple quota 3,724 2,052 0,937 0,961 -0,028 -0,017 
  droop quota 3,554 2,255 0,878 0,957 -0,056 -0,019 
M=1 
 
1,993 19,848 0,341 0,621 -0,467 -0,207 
M=2 d'hondt 1,969 20,348 0,333 0,611 -0,477 -0,214 
  other 3 2,000 19,852 0,344 0,621 -0,464 -0,207 
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DENMARK 
2007 Real 4,626 5,198 
5,563 57,522 
0,795 0,910 -0,100 -0,041 
  d'hondt 4,626 5,198 0,795 0,910 -0,100 -0,041 
  saint-lague 5,519 1,911 0,990 0,967 -0,004 -0,015 
  simple quota 5,668 1,799 1,023 0,969 0,010 -0,014 
  droop quota 5,260 2,347 0,934 0,959 -0,030 -0,018 
M=1 
 
2,109 28,178 0,243 0,510 -0,614 -0,292 
M=2 all 4 2,351 24,849 0,296 0,568 -0,528 -0,246 
2011 Real 5,020 4,345 
5,850 56,690 
0,829 0,923 -0,082 -0,035 
  d'hondt 5,020 4,345 0,829 0,923 -0,082 -0,035 
  saint-lague 6,112 2,247 1,054 0,960 0,023 -0,018 
  simple quota 6,112 2,247 1,054 0,960 0,023 -0,018 
  droop quota 5,818 1,666 0,993 0,971 -0,003 -0,013 
M=1 
 
2,059 28,183 0,218 0,503 -0,661 -0,299 
M=2 all 4 2,351 24,485 0,279 0,568 -0,555 -0,246 
FINLAND 
2003 Real 4,881 3,196 
5,607 58,413 
0,843 0,945 -0,074 -0,024 
  d'hondt 4,721 4,012 0,808 0,931 -0,093 -0,031 
  saint-lague 5,108 1,864 0,892 0,968 -0,050 -0,014 
  simple quota 5,233 1,691 0,919 0,971 -0,037 -0,013 
  droop quota 5,075 2,275 0,885 0,961 -0,053 -0,017 
M=1 
 
2,281 25,864 0,278 0,557 -0,556 -0,254 
M=2 
d'hondt and sainte-
lague 3,260 15,049 0,491 0,742 -0,309 -0,129 
  simple and droop 3,490 13,871 0,541 0,763 -0,267 -0,118 
2007 Real 5,080 3,238 
5,834 59,470 
0,844 0,946 -0,074 -0,024 
  d'hondt 4,981 3,743 0,823 0,937 -0,084 -0,028 
  saint-lague 5,621 1,160 0,956 0,981 -0,020 -0,009 
  simple quota 5,637 1,031 0,959 0,983 -0,018 -0,008 
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  droop quota 5,467 1,528 0,924 0,974 -0,034 -0,011 
M=1 
 
2,676 21,762 0,347 0,634 -0,460 -0,198 
M=2 d'hondt 3,261 16,220 0,468 0,727 -0,330 -0,138 
  other 3 3,489 15,099 0,515 0,746 -0,288 -0,127 
PORTUGAL 
2009 Real 3,149 5,411 
3,833 50,331 
0,758 0,892 -0,120 -0,049 
  d'hondt 3,149 5,411 0,758 0,892 -0,120 -0,049 
  saint-lague 3,503 2,666 0,884 0,947 -0,054 -0,024 
  simple quota 3,627 1,357 0,927 0,973 -0,033 -0,012 
  droop quota 3,503 2,666 0,884 0,947 -0,054 -0,024 
M=1 
 
1,514 31,662 0,182 0,371 -0,741 -0,431 
M=2 d'hondt 2,206 17,523 0,426 0,652 -0,371 -0,186 
  other 3 2,201 17,372 0,424 0,655 -0,373 -0,184 
2011 Real 2,9609 5,4183 
3,670 48,332 
0,735 0,888 -0,134 -0,052 
  d'hondt 2,9609 5,4183 0,735 0,888 -0,134 -0,052 
  saint-lague 3,3059 2,5423 0,864 0,947 -0,064 -0,023 
  simple quota 3,3475 2,2285 0,879 0,954 -0,056 -0,021 
  droop quota 3,2817 2,663 0,855 0,945 -0,068 -0,025 
M=1 
 
1,2237 39,171 0,084 0,190 -1,077 -0,722 
M=2 d'hondt 2,0182 18,664 0,381 0,614 -0,419 -0,212 
  saint-l. ja droop 2,0258 19,066 0,384 0,606 -0,415 -0,218 
  simple quota 2,0265 19,424 0,385 0,598 -0,415 -0,223 
ESTONIA 
2007 Real 4,369 3,426 
5,020 56,696 
0,838 0,940 -0,077 -0,027 
  d'hondt 3,886 7,176 0,718 0,873 -0,144 -0,059 
  saint-lague 4,916 3,161 0,974 0,944 -0,011 -0,025 
  simple quota 4,916 2,878 0,974 0,949 -0,011 -0,023 
  droop quota 4,464 3,980 0,862 0,930 -0,065 -0,032 
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M=1 
 
1,786 32,729 0,195 0,423 -0,709 -0,374 
M=2 simple quota 2,547 20,373 0,385 0,641 -0,415 -0,193 
  other 3 2,599 19,563 0,398 0,655 -0,400 -0,184 
2011 Real 3,842 4,444 
4,495 56,062 
0,813 0,921 -0,090 -0,036 
  d'hondt 3,836 4,305 0,811 0,923 -0,091 -0,035 
  saint-lague 4,030 2,917 0,867 0,948 -0,062 -0,023 
  simple quota 4,076 2,771 0,880 0,951 -0,056 -0,022 
  droop quota 4,011 3,000 0,862 0,946 -0,065 -0,024 
M=1 
 
2,011 29,725 0,289 0,470 -0,539 -0,328 
M=2 simple quota 2,989 15,690 0,569 0,720 -0,245 -0,143 
  other 3 3,203 12,490 0,630 0,777 -0,200 -0,109 
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Kokkuvõte: “Valimissüsteemide mehaanilised efektid 
proportisionaalsusele ja parlamendi killustatusele” 
 
Valimissüsteemide näol on tegemist ülioluliste institutsioonidega demokraatia 
toimimise aspektist, sest nad mõjutavad suurel määral poliitilisi väljundeid. Lisaks 
sellele, et valimissüsteemid muundavad valijate hääled parlamendikohtadeks, 
mõjutavad nad ka laiemalt poliitilise süsteemi põhilisi tunnusjooni ning poliitilist 
kultuuri. Valimissüsteemide efektide uurimine on oluline mõistmaks paremini 
demokraatlike poliitiliste süsteemide toimimist üle maailma. 
Kirjanduses valitseb üldine konsensus, et ideaalset valimissüsteemi ei eksisteeri. 
Tunnistatakse, et igal süsteemil on omad eelised ja puudused ning et valimissüsteemi 
valikul on teatavate järeleandmiste tegemine möödapääsmatu. Valimissüsteemi valikul 
saab rääkida kahest põhilisest vastandlikust ideaalist – esindatuse ideaal (ehk kõrge 
proportsionaalsus) ning vastutuse/aruandekohustuse ideaal (stabiilsed ühepartei 
valitsused ehk vähene parlamendi killustatus). Esindatuse ideaal käib käsikäes 
proportsionaalse esindatuse (PR) valimissüsteemidega ning vastutuse ideaal 
majoritaarsete süsteemidega. Need kaks ideaali on omavahel vastandlikud, sest mida 
proportsionaalsem on esindatus, seda rohkem tegutsejaid on parlamendis, mis aga 
omakorda tähendab suurt parlamendi fragmenteeritust. Seega ei ole võimalik korraga 
püüelda nii esindatuse kui vastutuse ideaali poole, vaid tuleb valida neist üks. 
Võiks arvata, et proportsionaalsuse ja fragmenteerituse vahel on lineaarne seos – mida 
suurem proportsionaalsus, seda suurem on killustatus ja vastupidi. Empiirilised andmed 
aga seda oletust ei toeta, proportsionaalsuse ja fragmenteerituse vaheline seos ei ole 
kindlasti mitte lineaarne (vt. jooniseid 2.1 ja 2.2 peatükis 2). Veelgi enam,  pilt tundub 
kirju – proportsionaalsuse ja fragmenteerituse vahel justkui ei olekski selget seost. 
Seega on oluline välja selgitada, miks ei ole näha selget seost muutujate vahel, mis 
peaksid olemuslikult olema omavahel vastandlikud. 
Käesoleva magistritöö eesmärgiks oli uurida lähemalt valimissüsteemide mehaanilisi 
efekte proportsionaalsusele ja killustatusele. Tuginedes uue institutsionalismi teooriale, 
võeti uurimuse aluseks tõdemus, et valimissüsteemide väljundites selgete seoste 
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nägemine ei ole võimalik ilma konteksti arvesse võtmata. Kui aga hoida kontekst 
uurimuses kontrolli all, on võimalik näha selget mustrit proportsionaalsuse ja 
killustatuse vahel. 
Leidmaks võimalikku universaalset seost ebaproportsionaalsuse (LSq) ja parlamendi 
killustatuse (Ns) vahel, viidi läbi arvutuslik eksperiment. Eksperimendis kasutati 
ringkonnatasandi valimistulemuste andmeid 5 riigi ja 10 valimise jaoks, mis pärinesid 
CLEA andmebaasist. Kasutades sama häälte sisendit, arvutati iga valimise jaoks välja 
mitmeid alternatiivseid kohtade jaotusi erinevate valimisreeglite korral. See tähendab, 
eksperimendis muudeti vaid valimissüsteemi, sisendi poolt hoiti konstantsena. Nii 
tekkis võimalus näha variatsioone vaid valimissüsteemide mehaanilistes efektides. Kuna 
eksperimendis oli aga 10 erinevat sisendit, uuritavad muutujad normaliseeriti 
universaalse seose leidmise eesmärgil. Kasutades normaliseerimiseks iga häältejaotuse 
loogiliste ankrupunktide väärtusi (0 ja LSqmax; 1 ja Nv), jõuti järgneva universaalse 
seoseni: 
 
Teisiti öeldes leiti käesolevas töös, et normaliseeritud ebaproportsionaalsuse (LSq') ja 
parlamendi fragmenteerituse (Ns') vahel on ruutseos: Ns' = LSq'
2
. See on oluline 
avastus, sest üldjuhul on vaikimisi eeldatud, et proportsionaalsuse ja fragmenteerituse 
vaheline suhe on absoluutne, st lineaarne. Antud analüüsi tulemused aga näitavad, et see 
nii ei ole ning parimaks sobituseks osutus hoopiski ruutmudel. 
On oluline rõhutada, et täpne seos proportsionaalsuse ja fragmenteerituse vahel sõltub 
kontekstist (häälte jaotusest). LSqmax ja Nv, mida kasutati normaliseerimiseks, on 
erinevad iga häälte jaotuse jaoks. Tegemaks täpseid ennustusi valimissüsteemide 
mehaaniliste efektide kohta proportsionaalsusele ja killustatusele, on vajalik teada häälte 
jaotust. Ilma konteksti arvesse võtmata, ei ole võimalik selget seost LSq ja Ns vahel 
välja tuua. 
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Ruutseose Ns' = LSq'
2 testimine laiemal andmestikul tõestas seose paikapidavust. PR 
valimissüsteemide jaoks oli testimise eesmärgil võimalik teha valemiline lihtsustus – 
Lsqmax on PR süsteemide jaoks ligikaudu 50%. Lihtsustuse abil sai valemi 
paikapidavust testida ühtekokku 340 PR valimise puhul, avaldades algsest valemist Ns-i 
ning võrreldes seda reaalse Ns-ga. Tulemused näitasid, et PR süsteemide puhul 
ennustab valem Ns' = LSq'
2
 Ns-i väärtust äärmiselt täpselt. Testimaks seose 
paikapidavust majoritaarsete süsteemide puhul, sarnast lihtsustust ei olnud võimalik 
teha, sest LSqmax-i täpne väärtus mõjutab nendes süsteemides Ns-i väärtust olulisel 
määral. Selle asemel avaldati LSqmax-i väärtus Nv ja v1 (võitva partei häälte saak) 
kaudu: 
 
Taaskord võrreldi tegelikku Ns-i arvutusliku Ns-ga, kasutades tulemusi 40 majoritaarse 
süsteemiga valimistelt. Ruutvalem ennustas jällegi Ns-i tegelikku väärtust väga täpselt. 
Selgus aga, et majoritaarsete süsteemide puhul ennustas valem süsteemselt pisut 
madalamaid Ns-i väärtusi võrreldes tegelikuga. See tulemus näitab meile, et valem Ns' = 
LSq'
2
 peab paika PR süsteemide puhul, kuid majoritaarsete süsteemide peaks valemis 
kaaluma veidi väiksema eksponendi väärtuse kasutamist (ligikaudu 1,7). 
Testimise tulemused näitavad, et valemi Ns' = LSq'
2
 näol on tegemist pigem esimese 
lähenduse, mitte aga universaalse reegliga. Selgus, et valem omab pisut erinevaid efekte 
PR ja majoritaarsete süsteemide jaoks, mistõttu tegelikkuses ei eksisteeri Ns' ja LSq' 
vahel mitte lihtne ruutseos, vaid pisut keerulisem seos. Tulevikus tuleks kindlasti see 
täpsem mudel ka välja töötada. Esimene lähendus Ns' = LSq'
2
 töötab aga piisavalt hästi 
ning on sobivaim tegemaks üldistusi LSq ja Ns vahelise suhte kohta. 
Magistritöö tulemused tõestasid, et suhe Ns' ja LSq' vahel ei ole lineaarne, mistõttu kahe 
vastandliku ideaali, kõrge proportsionaalsuse ja vähese killustatuse, optimeerimine on 
võimalik. Töös leiti, et suhe Ns' ja LSq' vahel on kõige optimaalsem, kui 
ringkonnamagnituud on 1 või 2. See tulemus vajab aga kindlasti täiendavat uurimist ja 
tõlgendamist, sest see võib olla teataval määral mõjutatud konkreetsest viisist, kuidas 
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Ns ja LSq normaliseeriti. Sellegipoolest viitavad töö tulemused sellele, et kahe 
demokraatliku ideaali optimum on saavutatav tunduvalt väiksemate 
ringkonnamagnituudide korral kui varasemalt arvatud. 
Käesolev töö jätab avatuks väga olulise küsimuse. Leiti, et seos Ns' = LSq'
2
 peab 
võrdlemisi hästi paika nii PR kui ka majoritaarsete süsteemide puhul. Küsimus on: 
miks? Miks on LSq' ja Ns' vahel just ruutseos? Kõik muutujad valemis on avaldatavad 
häälte ja kohtade jaotuste kaudu – võib eeldada, et just häälte-kohtade suhe peaks 
aitama selgitada eelpool väljatoodud ruutseose kehtivust. Seda tuleks aga tulevikus 
kindlasti täiendavalt uurida. 
Lõpetuseks, magistritöö selgitas välja ruutseose normaliseeritud proportsionaalsuse ja 
parlamendi fragmenteerituse vahel. Näidati, et see seos peab paika, kui testida seda 
laiemal andmestikul. Käesolev töö on esimene samm LSq ja Ns vahelise täpse seose 
leidmise ja selgitamise suunas, mida varasemalt tehtud ei ole. Lihtsustatud mudel 
Ns' =LSq'
2
 on heaks stardipunktiks edasistele uuringutele, mida võiks ja tuleks tulevikus 
läbi viia töös kerkinud küsimuste tõttu. Ruutseose avastamine Ns' ja LSq' vahel on aga 
oluliseks panuseks mõistmaks paremini valimissüsteemide mehaanilisi efekte 
poliitilistele väljunditele. 
 
